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It is common in philosophy for philosophers to consult their intuitions regarding 
philosophical issues, and then use those intuitions as evidence for their 
arguments.  For instance, an incompatibilist about moral responsibility might argue 
that her position is correct because it is intuitive that, given a deterministic world, 
people cannot be morally responsible.  One might ask whether or not the 
philosopher is justified in using intuitions in her argument, but it seems that in order 
to answer this, we require an understanding of what intuitions are.  One 
characterisation of intuitions is that they are either ordinary beliefs, beliefs with 
particular aetiologies, or inclinations to believe.  An alternative view is that intuitions 
are unique, sui generis mental states, unique in the sense that they cannot be fully 
understood in terms of other mental states.  In this essay, I defend the belief view 
of intuitions.  I argue that intuitions are inclinations to believe, which are derived 
from unconscious reasoning processes which take our background beliefs and 
theories as input.  I defend this view against Elijah Chudnoff’s claim that intuitions 
are sui generis mental states akin to perceptual experiences.  I suggest that the 
analogy Chudnoff draws between perceptions and intuitions does not hold, because 
perceptions are belief independent, while intuitions are not.  I then respond to 
Chudnoff’s counter-example to the belief view, which is that it is possible to have 
an intuition but no corresponding belief or inclination to believe.  I formulate an 
error theory which demonstrates that it is possible to confuse the rejection of an 
intuition as part of our consciously derived beliefs, with the elimination of an 
intuition as part of our unconsciously derived beliefs.  Such confusion, I suggest, 
leads to Chudnoff’s putative counter-example that it is possible to have an intuition 




Intuitions can be roughly described as a kind of experience in which it seems to an 
agent, that something or other, is or is not, the case.  We can ask of these experiences, 
what kinds of experiences are they?  On this, there are two prominent analyses.  On the 
one hand, there is the belief view, according to which intuitions are either ordinary 
beliefs, beliefs with particular aetiologies, or inclinations to believe.  On the other hand 
is the view that intuitions are unique, sui generis mental states, unique in the sense 
that they cannot be fully understood in terms of other mental states.  In this essay, I 
defend the belief view of intuition.  My aim will be to argue that intuitions are best 
understood as inclinations to believe, which are caused by unconscious reasoning 
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processes which take our background beliefs and theories as input.  I defend this view 
against Elijah Chudnoff’s (2011) opposing claim that intuitions are sui generis mental 
states. I then suggest that the analogy Chudnoff draws between perceptions and 
intuitions does not hold, because perceptions are belief independent, while intuitions 
are not.  I then respond to Chudnoff’s counter-example to the belief view, which consists 
in the claim that it is possible to have an intuition, but no corresponding belief or 
inclination to believe.  I will do this by providing him with an error theory that I hope, 
demonstrates that his counter-example to the belief view does not hold.  By casting 
doubt on Chudnoff’s notion of an intuition as sui generis mental state, and by 
responding to his criticisms against the belief view, I hope to vindicate the view that 
intuitions are inclinations to believe, which take our background beliefs and theories as 
input. 
 
2 Kinds of Intuitions 
Before we can begin to offer an analysis, we need to establish more precisely what 
constitutes an intuition, and ask what kinds of intuitions are relevant to this essay.  In 
ordinary usage, there are lots of senses in which one might be said to have an intuition.  
For instance, consider a mother’s intuition that her child is unwell, or the intuition of a 
lost traveller on which is the best way to find safety.  The mother’s intuition might be 
the result of maternal instinct, while the traveller’s intuition may be based in an 
inexplicably good sense of direction.  While such intuitions are irrelevant to this essay, 
it is important to highlight a common feature between all intuitions, including these 
ones.  This common feature is that intuitions are all experiences in which it seems to 
the agent who has the intuition, that something is the case.  For the mother, it seems 
to her that her child is unwell, and for the traveller, it seems to them that north is the 
best direction to go.  All intuitions appear to have this quality of seeming, although often 
these seemings consist in different things, be it a maternal instinct, sense of direction 
etc.  In this paper however, I will be concerned only with those intuitions employed and 
generated within philosophical argument and thought.  In explaining such intuitions, 
consider the case where someone asks you to consider the proposition that “a fully 
rational person does not believe both P and not P” (Pust, 2016).  The result of considering 
this proposition may be that it seems to you that it is true that a fully rational person 
does not believe both P and not P.  These are the kinds of intuitions that a philosopher 
might use when thinking or arguing.  Further examples include: 
(1) It is impossible for a circle to be completely blue and completely yellow 
(2) Murder is wrong 
(3) S is only morally responsible for x, if S could have done otherwise 
When I reflect on the proposition (2) it seems to me that it is the case that murder is 
wrong.  When I reflect on proposition (3), it seems to me that it is true that S is only 
morally responsible for x, if S could have done otherwise.  The same seeming occurs 
when considering (1).  These philosophical intuitions are cases where intuitions emerge 
in virtue of our reflection on these propositions.  The thought here is that there is 
something about these propositions, which results in our having intuitions about their 
truth (or falsity).  However, this doesn’t really tell us anything about what these 
intuitions are, or where they come from.  One way of explaining where intuitions come 
from is to say that they are just beliefs that I have, and this is the view that I consider 
in the next section. 
 
3 Intuitions as Beliefs 
In this section I introduce the view that intuitions are beliefs.  The three main views in 
this school of thought are as follows: 1) the simple view that intuitions are just like our 
ordinary beliefs, 2) the aetiological view that intuitions are beliefs with different 
aetiologies, and 3) the inclination view that intuitions are inclinations to believe 
(inclination view). 
One account of the simple view comes from Lewis, who claims that “our “intuitions” are 
simply opinions; our philosophical theories are the same” (Lewis, 1983, x). Under this 
view, there is no significant difference between our intuitions and our ordinary beliefs.  
The main claim of this view is as follows: 
(S) “S has the intuition that P, if and only if S believes that P” (Pust, 2016) 
The aetiological view is the view that intuitions are beliefs with particular aetiologies.  A 
good reason to hold this view stems from the thought that intuitions have characteristics 
that distinguish them from our ordinary beliefs, such as the spontaneous way in which 
they strike us, or their inexplicability.  Gopnik and Schwitzgebel’s (1998, 77) account of 
these features is that the aetiology of intuitions consists in subconscious processes, 
which we cannot directly observe. We can define this as: 
(A) If S has the intuition that p, then S forms the belief as part of an unconscious 
reasoning process that S cannot directly observe. 
The final belief view I will discuss is the view that intuitions are not beliefs, but 
inclinations to believe.  Earlenbaugh and Molyneux defend this view, suggesting that 
intuitions are only a sub-class of inclinations to believe, which means that not every 
inclination to believe is an intuition (Earlenbaugh and Molyneux, 2009). We can 
characterise this view in the following way: 
(I) If S has the intuition that p, then S has an inclination to believe that P 
Of these three views, the aetiological view and inclination view are preferable to the 
simple view.  The problem with the simple view, as noted in my introduction of the 
aetiological view, is that it doesn’t really capture the unique flavour of intuition 
experiences; their spontaneity and inexplicability.  For these reasons, I will not attempt 
to defend the simple belief view here, so from here on out my discussion will be entirely 
focused on the aetiological view and the inclination view. 
4 Against Intuitions as Beliefs 
In his paper, “What Are Intuitions Like” Elijah Chudnoff (2011, 626) argues against the 
belief, or to use his terminology, “doxastic” view, by providing two objections which he 
believes applies to any interpretation of the belief view.  Each objection targets one of 
the following two general principles which Chudnoff takes belief views to be committed 
to: 
“(DoxI1) Necessarily: If x has an intuition that p, then x judges, or has an 
inclination to judge, that p” (Chudnoff, 2011, 627) 
“(DoxI2) Necessarily: If x has judges, or has an inclination to judge that p, then x 
has an intuition that p” (Chudnoff, 2011, 627) 
It should be noted that Chudnoff uses the word “judgement” instead of “belief.”  The 
reason being that Chudnoff is arguing against doxastic accounts of intuition in general, 
so he wants a general term which captures all the different kinds of doxastic attitudes 
or judgements one might have regarding a proposition.  Beliefs are themselves one kind 
of doxastic attitude or judgement, so they are captured by the term ‘judgement’ in (DoxI1) 
and (DoxI2). 
Another thing to note is that belief views need not be committed to both (DoxI1) and 
(DoxI2).  Chudnoff himself suggests that most doxasticists wouldn’t commit themselves 
to (DoxI2) (Chudnoff, 2011, 627).  I am inclined to agree that none of the belief views I 
wish to discuss are committed to (DoxI2). 2    In fact, Earlenbaugh and Molyneux, 
explicitly refute (DoxI2), by stating that not every inclination to believe amounts to an 
intuition (Earlenbaugh and Molyneux, 89).  Nevertheless, the belief views discussed here 
are all committed to (DoxI1), since each view identifies intuitions with either judgements 
or inclinations to judge3.  It follows from all three views then, that at a minimum, if one 
has an intuition that p, then one will have either a belief, aetiological belief, or an 
inclination to believe, depending on which of the belief views one ascribes to.  For the 
simple view, any old belief is an intuition, because intuitions are just ordinary beliefs.  
For the aetiological view, intuitions will be a belief with a specific origin, which 
distinguishes them from our ordinary beliefs.  For the inclination view, intuitions will 
just be a certain leaning, or willingness that we have to believe in whatever it is we are 
having and intuition about.  Given that each view is committed to (DoxI1), if Chudnoff’s 
objection against (DoxI1) holds, then it seems that it will hold against all three views. 
Chudnoff’s argument against (DoxI1) demonstrates that it is possible to have an 
intuition that p, without the belief or the inclination to believe that p.  In other words, 
to show: 
“Not-(DoxI1):  Possibly: x has an intuition that p and does not judge, or have any 
inclination to judge, that p” (Chudnoff, 2011, 632)    
Chudnoff’s begins his strategy for demonstrating that Not-(DoxI1) by drawing an 
analogy between intuitions and perceptions.4  Chudnoff supports the sui generis view 
of intuitions, and the sui generis mental state that intuitions consist in is a unique 
experience, that can’t be entirely explained in terms of our other mental states, and 
which is supposed to be similar to a perceptual experience5.  For Chudnoff, our sense 
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perceptions present the external world as being a certain way, while our intuitions 
present abstract matters to us in a certain way (Chudnoff, 2011, 626).  An important 
similarity between these different experiences is that one can have an intuition that 
p, yet not believe, (or be inclined to believe) that p, in the same sense that one can 
perceive p, and yet not believe, (or be inclined to believe), that p. 
First, let’s unpick what it means for someone to perceive p, yet not believe that p?  
Consider the illusion of a hollow mask. In this illusion, the concave side of the mask 
visually appears to be the convex side of the mask.  Once I am aware of the illusion, 
my perception of the concave side remains unaffected and I still perceive it as the 
convex side.  However, I neither believe, nor am I inclined to believe that I am 
perceiving the convex side, because I know that I am perceiving an illusion.  What I 
do have however, is a “sensory seeming”6 that I am seeing the convex side of the mask.  
Nevertheless, Chudnoff (2011, 628) suggests, because our perceptions are belief 
independent, they will not change even if we know or believe that we are perceiving 
illusions. 
I have established what it means to have a perception that p, but no belief or 
inclination to believe that p.  However, we still need to explain how it is possible to 
have the intuition that p, yet not believe that p, which is Chudnoff’s view.  Take the 
intuition criticised by Gettier (1963), that the Justified True Belief (JTB) theory of 
knowledge is the correct theory of knowledge. Gettier objected to the intuition by 
presenting a counter-example to it, which showed that it is possible to have a justified 
true belief which does not amount to knowledge.  Having read Gettier, I no longer 
believe in the justified true belief theory of knowledge, nor am I inclined to believe it.  
Nevertheless, Chudnoff would suggest that it is still possible that I have the intuition 
that JTB is true, despite my not believing, nor being inclined to believe it.   In order 
to highlight how this is possible, consider another case from Bealer (1998, 208), who 
claims that this phenomenon occurs to him when he considers the naïve 
comprehension axiom. He does not believe, nor is he inclined to believe in it, but he 
claims that it intellectually seems to him that the axiom is true, which is to say that 
he has the intuition that it is true.  This intellectual seeming works similarly to the 
sensory seeming in the hollow mask illusion.  Just as the sensory seeming represents 
an image of the external world, the intellectual seeming represents an image of the 
abstract world. However, because I know that this intellectual seeming is false, I do 
not believe, nor am I inclined to believe it, just as I have no belief or inclination to 
believe that my perception of the mask is not an illusion. 
The belief views I have raised are committed to the claim that if one has an intuition 
that p, then one has either some kind of belief that p, or an inclination to believe that 
p.  Chudnoff and Bealer have provided counter-examples to that claim, whereby one 
still has an intuition that p, yet one has no belief, nor any inclination to believe that 
p.  The challenge for a supporter of these belief views then, as Chudnoff (2011, 633) 
argues, is to provide an error theory that shows how Chudnoff and Bealer are going 
wrong when they say that they have an intuition without any corresponding belief or 
inclination to believe. 
 
                                                          
6 This term comes from Bealer, “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy” p.208 
5 The Disanalogy Between Intuitions and Perceptions 
Before discussing a potential error theory for Chudnoff and Bealer’s counter-examples 
to the belief view, I would first like to discuss another objection to their theory, which 
focuses on Chudnoff’s claim that intuitions are similar to perceptual experiences, and 
since beliefs are not perceptual, they cannot fully capture the nature of intuitions.7  I 
will argue that in fact, intuitions have more in common with beliefs than intuitions.  I 
argue that perceptions are belief independent, which is to say that perceptions do not 
change when our beliefs change.  I argue that this independency does not occur with 
purported intellectual seemings, because intuitions are belief dependent.  I then suggest 
that the best explanation for the belief dependency of intuitions is not that they are 
intellectual seemings, presenting abstract matters to us in some way, but rather, they 
are inclinations to believe in a proposition.  I will then argue that these inclinations 
result from an unconscious reasoning process which takes our current tacit and 
background beliefs and theories as their inputs. 
A good reason to accept Chudnoff’s account of intuitions as sui generis mental states is 
grounded in the fact that his theory accounts for the supposed similarities between 
intellectual seemings (intuitions) and sensory seemings (perceptions).  Intuitions are sui 
generis mental states that present abstract matters to us, in the same way that sensory 
experiences present the external world to us.  Chudnoff’s objection in the previous 
section drew the analogy between perceiving a visual illusion and perceiving abstract 
phenomena such as naive comprehension.  My objection to this analogy is to point out 
that our perceptions of illusions are belief independent,8 while our intuitions appear to 
be belief-dependent.  The thought being that our intuitions about a given phenomena 
may change as our beliefs about the world change, unlike our sensory perceptions of 
illusions, which remain constant even when our beliefs change.  But if intuitions are 
supposed to be like perceptual experiences, then it seems as though they shouldn’t be 
belief dependent, and should be consistent in the same way that sensory perceptions 
are consistent, which is to say that they don’t change just because our beliefs change. 
In the hollow mask illusion case, even when I know that I am seeing an illusion, this 
knowledge cannot alter my perception such that I no longer perceive the reality and not 
the illusion.  However, when it comes to intuitions, they often change when my beliefs 
about the world change.  In fact, often our intuitions disappear entirely over time as our 
beliefs change, unlike our sensory perceptions of illusions.  Gopnik and Schwitzgebel 
(1998, 75-91) provide an example of this disappearance of intuition within 
developmental psychology. Their case study describes the differences between the 
intuitions of young children and fully-grown adults.  One case focuses on the intuition 
that all beliefs are true, possessed by most three-year-olds.  As children develop and 
learn more about the world, this intuition disappears, perhaps as children realise 
through experience that beliefs do not always correspond to truth.  This causes a change 
in their understanding, and they no longer have the intuition that all beliefs are true.  If 
we take for granted that most children have these intuitions, and if we suppose these 
intuitions are intellectual seemings in the way proposed by Chudnoff and Bealer, it 
seems strange that we no longer have access to these intellectual seemings now, when 
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we consider the proposition of whether beliefs are always true.  The fact that we don’t 
believe it, or that we are not inclined to believe it shouldn’t matter, because if it did 
matter, then that would suggest that intuitions consisted in our beliefs or inclinations 
to believe, but Bealer and Chudnoff want to insist that they are not. 
Gopnik and Schwitzgebel’s case study demonstrates how intuitions are affected by 
beliefs, because the intuitions of these children change when they develop and learn 
more about the world.9   In other words, it demonstrates the belief dependency of 
intuitions.  Moreover, these cases aren’t limited to developmental psychology, they also 
occur within philosophy.  Philosophers may (and often do) begin with intuitions that 
some theory is true, which disappear when they determine its falsehood.  I for instance, 
used to find the JTB theory intuitively true, but after reading and reflecting on Gettier 
counter-examples, I don’t have any such intuition anymore.  If intuitions are perceptual 
experiences, they should not be belief dependent in this way.  When it comes to my 
sense perception of the illusion, I might know every last detail about the illusion, why it 
occurs etc., but none of this knowledge removes the sensory seeming.  However, when 
it comes to supposed intellectual seemings, they seem to change depending on my 
beliefs, as they do in the case where I reflect on Gettier counter-examples to the JTB 
theory of knowledge.  If this is the case, then it isn’t clear that there is any good reason 
to suppose that intuitions are anything over and above beliefs or inclinations to believe, 
that emerge from our current understanding and beliefs about the world. 
Chudnoff and Bealer could respond here by drawing a new analogy between perceptions 
and intuitions.  Perhaps these belief dependent intuitions are not akin to perceptual 
experiences of illusions, but cases of perceiving things unclearly.  Suppose I quickly 
glance out of my window and think I see a bird, but it turns out to be a balloon when I 
look more closely.  My perception was mistaken because I wasn’t looking clearly, and 
when I did look clearly, I saw the object for what it was.  After seeing things clearly, I 
would not have the perception of a bird again because I am focusing clearly, thus my 
perception changes accordingly when I focus properly.  In the same way, in the case of 
belief dependent intuitions, perhaps I’m just not focused enough to intellectually see 
things clearly enough.  This seems apt for explaining why my childhood intuitions about 
beliefs have disappeared, because when I was a child I did not have much of a grasp on 
reality I do now, in other words, I wasn’t seeing things clearly then as I am now. 
In response to this, it is worth pointing out that it seems as though all intuitions are 
belief dependent.  Even regarding Bealer’s intuition about naïve comprehension, it is 
perfectly possible that somebody who used to have such an intuition, loses their 
intuition entirely once their understanding of the world changes enough.10  If this is 
right, then I suggest that there aren’t any intuitions which have the kind belief 
independency that perception has.  My perceptions don’t change depending my beliefs, 
yet my intuitions do often change depending on my beliefs.  While Chudnoff and Bealer 
can account for this by drawing the analogy between intuitions and not perceiving 
things correctly, I think it is equally plausible to suggest that intuitions are just beliefs 
or inclinations to believe that result from our current understanding of the world, since 
all cases of intuition, I have suggested, seem belief dependent anyway.  Given this, the 
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belief view is no less plausible than the sui generis view.  Moreover, the belief view is the 
more parsimonious of the two, as it doesn’t posit any new entities such as sui generis 
mental states, and given that both views equally account for the same phenomena, we 
have good reason to favour the belief view. 
 
6 Rejecting and Eliminating Intuitions 
 
In the previous section I objected to Bealer and Chudnoff’s claim that intuitions are 
similar to perceptual experiences.  However, this hasn’t done much to respond to 
Bealer’s claim that when he comprehends the naïve comprehension axiom, he has an 
intuition but no belief nor any inclination to believe it.  The task of this section is to 
explain what is occurring here, and why Bealer is wrong to say that he has no belief, or 
inclination to believe, in naïve comprehension. 
I will go about this by defending Williamson’s claim that what occurs in cases like 
Bealer’s, is that he has the intuition that Naïve comprehension is true, which is an 
inclination to believe, which is then resisted because he knows better (Williamson, 2007, 
217). Although this means adopting a defence of the inclination view in favour of the 
aetiological view, I will not be dismissing the aetiological view entirely for two reasons.  
First, I think Gopnik and Schwitzgebel are right to claim that intuitions result from 
unconscious processes driven by background theory.  Moreover, I think it is perfectly 
reasonable to suppose that these unconscious processes driven by background do result 
in beliefs.  My intuition that murder is wrong is the result of an unconscious process, 
nevertheless I also believe it.11  The problem however, is that this isn’t necessarily always 
the case, and Bealer’s naïve comprehension example is one such case where there is no 
belief.  What there is in this case, is an inclination to believe in naïve comprehension, 
which results from an unconscious process, and it is this inclination to believe that 
Bealer is missing. 
Suppose it is true that intuitions are driven by unconscious or underground processes 
which cannot be directly observed, and that sometimes this process leads us to form 
beliefs.   Contrast this process with  a conscious thought processes which can also lead 
us to form beliefs.  For beliefs that arise consciously, we are usually able reflect on the 
process which led to the belief, something which does not occur with intuitions driven 
by unconscious processes. What we have then, are two different processes, one 
unconsciously driven by background theory, and a conscious process driven primarily 
by our current conscious considerations. 
I think that when Bealer has the intuition that naïve comprehension is true, there is a 
conflict between the unconscious and conscious processes.  Bealer’s intuition is an 
inclination to believe that naïve comprehension is false, which is caused by an 
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unconscious reasoning process driven by background theory, which he cannot 
consciously observe.  This intuition conflicts with Bealer’s conscious thought process, 
which has led him to the conclusion that naïve comprehension is false.  When Bealer is 
made aware of this conflict, or indeed, when anyone realises that they hold an 
inconsistent set of beliefs, he rejects his intuition.12  However, I do not think that merely 
rejecting an inclination to believe will eliminate the inclination altogether.  Bealer’s error 
then, is to suppose that rejecting his intuition also eliminates the intuition.  
The reason why the rejection of an intuition does not eliminate the intuition is due to 
the fact that intuitions, conceived as the fruits of unconscious processes driven by 
background theory, are not something that we have direct control over.  I claim that the 
only way to eliminate an intuition is to change the background theory which the 
unconscious process takes as its input in generating intuitions.  To see this point, think 
back to the children’s intuitions about beliefs.  In that case, it was suggested that the 
false intuitions of the children only disappear once the child’s background theory 
changes, which occurs as they gain a better understanding of the world around them 
(Gopnik and Schwitzgebel, 1998, 91).  I suggest that in Bealer’s case, his background 
theory has not changed enough in order to get rid of his intuition, and that is why he 
still has it. 
Nevertheless, Bealer will still insist that he has no inclination to believe in naïve 
comprehension, and my considerations have not yet shown how he misses such an 
inclination.  I think part of the solution to this, strange as it may seem, is that in a sense 
Bealer is right.  He does have no inclination to accept naïve comprehension, in the sense 
that he has no inclination to accept naïve comprehension as a part of his conscious 
reasoning processes.  Nevertheless, the inclination still emerges from his intuitive 
unconscious process.  Bealer’s error then, is to suppose that just because he is not 
inclined to accept naïve comprehension in his conscious account of reality, that he has 
no inclination whatsoever, to accept it.  My response is that he does have such an 
inclination, an inclination resulting from this background process, which cannot be 
eliminated unless Bealer’s background theory itself changes.  A useful analogy here is 
that of a scientist who accepts counter-intuitive theories in their scientific image of the 
world because their theory demands it, even though their ordinary intuitions are 
inconsistent with it.  Nevertheless, the scientist won’t be inclined to using those 
intuitions in their scientific theories, because their scientific considerations won’t allow 
for it, and this is also what occurs with Bealer.  His background understanding of the 
world causes the inclination to believe that naïve comprehension is true, but Bealer is 
not inclined to accept this intuition into his explicit theory.  Bealer takes this lack of 
inclination to accept the intuition as a part of his explicit account of reality as a lack of 
inclination altogether.  I on the other hand, claim that Bealer cannot remove the 
inclination by simple refusing to admit it into his explicit theory; his background theory 
first must change, but then the intuition experience will go away altogether, thus, it is 
not possible to have an intuition that p, but no inclination whatsoever, to believe that 
p. 
                                                          
12 Moreover, I think this rejection of the intuition is his reason for claiming that he has no belief, or inclination to believe.  If he 
accepted the intuition, it seems he would claim to believe it, or if he suspended judgement, it would seem that he might claim 
to have an inclination to believe it. 
7 Conclusion 
In this essay I argued that intuitions are inclinations to believe.  The simple belief view 
failed to capture the spontaneity and inexplicability of intuitions, and while the 
aetiological view could account for these features, it faced Chudnoff and Bealer’s 
counter-examples, whereby one has the intuition that p, yet no belief that p, regardless 
of the aetiological state.  However, I argued that even Chudnoff and Bealer’s view of 
intuitions as sui generis states fails, because their view is built on the claim that 
intuitions are like perceptions.  I suggested that this view fails because intuitions are 
belief dependent, while perceptions are not.  The idea of intuitions as inclinations to 
believe is the strongest view, I claim, because it offers the best account of the belief 
dependency of intuitions, as well as their spontaneity and inexplicability.  Moreover, 
when construed as inclinations that result from unconscious processes which take our 
background theories and understanding of the world as input, we can explain Bealer’s 
claim that he can have intuitions, yet no inclination to believe in those intuitions.  The 
claim is that Bealer really does have no inclination to believe in those intuitions, as a 
part of his explicit theories.  Nevertheless, until his background theory changes, those 
theories will still result in the inclination to believe in naïve comprehension, even if 
Bealer has no inclination to add it to his explicit theory. 
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